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In the Covid-19 crisis, Europe is paying a high price for diversity, write Alessio
Pacces and Maria Weimer. The failure to coordinate national public health
responses in the initial stage of the outbreak has undermined both the fight to
save lives and core European values and principles. But the fight against
Covid-19 is a marathon, not a sprint. Going forward, Europe’s survival will
depend on how it handles the exit from this crisis. The Commission has
published a European Roadmap for lifting Covid-19 measures – member
states must follow its recommendations before it is too late.
There is a paradox at the heart of the European fight against Covid-19.
Challenges of this kind are why we have the EU in the first place: to enable
effective collective action in the face of transboundary problems that no
member states can address on their own. Yet, in the current situation
national governments are calling the shots and making the EU look incredibly weak.
Member states’ divergent responses to this crisis reveal a lack of unity in the face of a
humanitarian catastrophe. At worst, they risk breaking up the Union altogether.
There are in principle good reasons for such diversity, which have to do with limited EU
competences. Health policy is a national competence and the EU only supports national
crisis management. This reflects the need to respect the sheer complexity of how
national health systems are organised. Different national approaches are rooted in
national culture and history, as well as in national federal structures (e.g. in Germany or
Italy, public health is a matter of sub-federal entities). National governments are best
placed to assess the availability of resources, critical infrastructures, and the expected
behaviour of citizens in a crisis. After all, trust in doctors and governments is shaped by
cultural attitudes and is a factor in determining the effectiveness of emergency
measures, such as social distancing and lockdowns. It is therefore not surprising that
member states have adopted different responses to Covid-19. They carry the political
responsibility for their crisis management vis-à-vis their citizens.
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Charles Michel, President of the European Council, with Ursula von der Leyen,
President of the European Commission, on 15 April 2020, Credit: European Union
It is clear then that divergent national responses to Covid-19 cannot be fully avoided. Yet,
they can and must be better coordinated. Without effective coordination, there is a steep
price to pay for diversity. This is where the EU should play the role it is destined to play.
The EU offers invaluable tools for coordination and support in situations of public health
emergencies. If used effectively by the member states, these tools can foster mutual
learning and solidarity, which are currently much needed, while respecting national
diversity. How well this potential is realised depends on the political will of national
governments. Unfortunately, at the moment, governments seem to be thinking about
short-term political gains rather than the medium- and long-term common European
interest. Let’s look at these arguments in turn.
The price of diversity is that decentralised policymaking on Covid-19 produces damaging
spillovers. For national containment strategies to be effective, border restrictions
between countries with different Covid-19 strategies must be introduced. As a result, for
several weeks now, we have been experiencing what it means to have borders again in
Europe. Even worse, border checks and restrictions are here to stay for some time
because when measures are lifted in some countries, they will still be in place in some
others, and this dissonance might be repeated in several rounds as part of any gradual
exit strategy until the vaccine is found. The resulting suspension of the free movement of
persons is likely to undermine everyone’s sense of belonging to the EU. It also reduces
interstate labour mobility, which combined with restrictions of the free movement of
goods increases the likelihood of Covid-19 causing a global supply shock.
In fact, different national Covid-19 measures also disrupt supply chains. Compared to a
‘normal’ recession, where a lack of demand is the problem, Covid-19 causes supply
problems. Economic output will fall because some production must be halted or reduced
to prevent excessive contagion. Inputs, such as equipment and labour that are
incompatible with social distancing, get scarcer and reduce the supply of certain goods.
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This is already affecting countries differently, depending on their specialisation and
openness to trade, but the differences will be exacerbated by the different timing of
containment and exit policies.
Countries in lockdown must cope with a shortage of goods and impose shortages on
others, not only because of underproduction but also due to hoarding, export bans, and
other restrictions. This is particularly alarming with regard to scarce yet urgently needed
medical equipment, the free movement of which member states have already tried to
restrict. We expect an increase of such protectionist reactions as more goods become
scarce as the virus spreads. This reflects a more general problem: asymmetric Covid-19
policies create conflicting interests which, in turn, undermine cooperation between
states.
This is why coordination at the EU level is so important. After the initial mistakes and
weak cooperation with regard to putting containment measures in place, it is now high
time to follow a coordinated European approach to the exit strategy. Testing the wider
population to determine contagion and immunity is key to any such exit strategy. On the
one hand, creating a safe space to work, in which people are either immune or not
infected (and distanced from anyone who could be), is crucial to restarting economies
after the contagion is under control, without risking a second peak of the outbreak. On
the other hand, having an EU approach to labour mobility and physical production could
overcome the current and foreseeable restrictions to the free movement of persons and
goods: for instance, workers from different member states could participate in EU ‘green
zones’, free of contagion, and produce scarce goods. Solutions of this kind would
complement national approaches to the exit strategy, but also promote more solidarity
between member states.
The EU offers important tools for coordination. Several EU agencies and expert bodies
(the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control, the Covid19 advisory panel,
the Joint Research Centre) coordinate scientific advice at the international and national
level and prepare guidelines for containment, testing, and surveillance of the virus. This
scientific advice is regularly discussed between the Commission and member states in
the so-called EU Health Security Committee, which is a crucial form of information
exchange and decision-making. The EU is also organising joint procurement of tests and
other medical equipment.
With regard to exit, the Commission published a roadmap for a coordinated EU exit
strategy on 15 April. Member states initially resisted the publication of this document.
Some, such as Austria and Denmark, announced unilateral plans to relax Covid-19
lockdowns, which differed from the plans of other EU countries. The insistence of the
Commission addresses our key concern: the longer the EU waits, the less room there will
be for coordination. This could result in long-lasting damage to free movement and EU
solidarity. Public health protection is equally at risk if national lockdowns are relaxed too
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quickly, particularly if this is based on political opportunism or economic lobbying rather
than commonly agreed science-based criteria. Differently from the former, the latter
take the still pervasive scientific uncertainty surrounding the virus into account.
The initiative of the Commission addresses these concerns. It is a commendable first step
towards delineating a common European framework on how to gradually lift
confinement measures, based on common principles of scientific advice, coordination
and solidarity. At the same time, however, the roadmap still leaves ample margins for
member states to continue restrictions of free movement in the presence of asymmetric
situations and policies. More EU leadership seems to be in order, particularly on the
collection of epidemiological data and the design and mutual recognition of testing and
tracing policies.
The fight against Covid-19 is a marathon, not a sprint. Europe’s survival will depend on
how it handles the exit from this crisis. We noted the challenge stemming from different
health policies in the EU. While this difference reflects national preferences and political
legitimacy, it has produced damaging spillovers between member states. We propose to
turn this challenge into an opportunity.
The EU has now indicated a European exit strategy from asymmetric, albeit gradually
converging, containment policies in relation to Covid-19. Such EU guidance, if followed,
could improve mutual learning between member states, which have been exposed to the
epidemic at different times and learned different lessons. So far, member states have
delayed learning from each other and undermined cooperation. This must change
before it is too late. The ball is now in the member states’ court. They must act in the
common European interest and follow the Commission’s lead in order for Europe to
resurrect united from the ashes of Covid-19.
For more information, see the authors’ recent paper at the European Journal of Risk
Regulation
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